What Effects on the Horn of Africa Will Come from the Crises in Tunisia and Egypt?

This question must be answered in close connection with the development in South Sudan – where more than 99% of people voted for independence – and Yemen, where popular uprisings led to Abdullah Saleh and his son renounce their taking part in the next election.

Salva Kiir, the Southern Sudanese most prominent leader, vowed moderation, which is instrumental in his getting with clear hands to the negotiation table with Omar al-Bashir’s central Government. It will nonetheless nudge Somaliland toward higher recognition hopes and this, in turn will exacerbate tensions with Puntland.

Southern Somalia extremely deteriorated scenario will not be affected much. Changes in the opposition camp (where Hizbul Islam has joined the al-Shabaab camp) have already taken place and the TFG has already countered the growing pression.

What we can see here is that international interest is now drained more than ever towards other areas. It is normal, but one should bear in mind that Somalia and the Horn of Africa are a crucial part of the wider arch of instability which is now developing. Addressing its issues will have immediate and beneficial effects on North African and Arab shores too.

Somalia: Al-Shabab militia attacks hotel in Mogadishu

Militants attacked on Tuesday the Muna hotel in Mogadishu, with tens of deaths (six of them at least are TFG lawmakers) and about one hundred wounded. The building is situated within a mile from the presidential palace “Villa Somalia” and is regularly used by officials and politicians of the Transitional Federal Government. According to witnesses, at about 10.00 a.m., a small group of armed men (5 to 8 people), disguised as TFG militiamen and “not Somalis” had tried to attack the Sahafi hotel, being rejected by security militias; they then folded on to the Muna, where they succeeded in penetrating the structure, killing civilians and officials indiscriminately before exploding their belts when overwhelmed by security.

The wounded are transported to the Medina hospital in Mogadishu for injuries caused by gun shots and chips, which confirms the use of explosives during the attack as detailed by witnesses who escaped the massacre. The night between Monday 23rd and Tuesday 24th had passed quietly after several attacks had taken place on Monday against the barracks of militia hired by institutions, particularly in the districts of Holwadag, Hodan and Bondhere where violent shootings and artillery exchange had killed at least thirty civilians.

Sheikh Ali Mohamoud Rage, a spokesman for al-Shabab movement, had declared the start of a “final” war against the “invader”, namely the approximately 6,000 AMISOM peacekeepers that are in the country to protect the Transitional Institutions and major infrastructures. The arrival of several hundred reinforcements (from Uganda, as planned in July; about 1,200 more men are to arrive, i.e. one fifth of the total present so far) may have convinced violent opponents of the Transitional Institutions not to further delay the escalation before a change in power relations becomes noticeable. This, despite being in the middle of the Ramadan, a fact that should have further postponed the attacks.

President Sheikh Sharif and several other members of the TFG had themselves repeatedly promised the beginning of a conquest of southern territories: hitherto a war of words and announcements, which seems to have entered an operational phase. The Government is, however, on the defensive. Wafula Wamunyinyi, the Deputy Special Representative of the African Union, had said on Monday that the situation in Mogadishu can “further deteriorate ” and renewed the invitation to the international community to support peacemaking efforts.

The Horn of Africa and the trends of international terrorism

Reading the statistics of terrorist attacks in the world, it is to be noted that more than seventy percent of the events (about ten thousand a year, and increasing) occurs in South-eastern Asia and the Middle East. Highly unstable Afghanistan and Pakistan (and India, albeit claims are more “social”) and Iraq and Persian Gulf countries account for such a high figure. At the southernmost limit of this area lies the Horn of Africa, which is adversely affected.

The region is also affected by the persistence of old and diverse sources of extremism in Equatorial sub-Saharan Africa, where a wide array of diversified phenomena is to be found, ranging from Equatorial Guinea to Niger, northern Chad, the south-west of Sudan and the inner regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The threats here rooted affect the Great Lakes region in Africa: Uganda and Kenya, locked in a deadly grip by the parallel menaces coming from East Africa and which found – in the attacks in Kampala on July, 11th, a shocking and immediate visibility. The Horn of Africa is hence merely the tip of a submerged, frightening and extremely difficult to avoid iceberg. Sources of risk are ineradicable in the short term (six to twelve months).

For this to be possible within a longer time frame (the next two to five years) it is necessary to seek solutions to regional problems in the broader context of continental and international scenario while – in parallel – not letting these considerations be an obstacle in understanding the reasons behind local political and military leaders reasoning, while keeping in mind the strategic developments and operational trends. The first fact to grasp is fragmentation.

In Somalia one notes the extreme ineffectiveness of the Transitional Federal Government – more than five years after its birth – even in setting however small technical standards for collaboration, needed to create the armed forces to conduct the fight against extremists. These are themselves deeply divided, as evidenced by defections among factions, most often to gain localized or personalized benefits. The situation is better in the northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland and in Ethiopia, where recent elections were a test of stability that has ended positively.

A second fact is the simultaneous presence of networks of piracy and recruitment of international terrorism. The focus of the threat is in particular on the transit of foreign jihadists or the return in these areas of Somali expatriates that have guerrilla experience abroad. These are the most dangerous cases, but it is difficult to establish a link between the two realities. These seem to represent distinct sources of threat: increasingly, boats that have fallen victims of piracy head to Harardheere (Mudug, in central Somalia, Islam conquered by Hizbul in May) rather than to southern ports, confirming that the two networks are not merging.

The pirates have commenced (from February to March 2010) to attack Somali ships, which had not represented an objective of their actions so far: this has led towards a further separation between the bands of pirates and those related to Al-Shabaab. The core of pirate actions is moved back out to deep water seas – towards India, north to the Gulf of Aden and up beyond the Bab el-Mandeb strait (in mid-July 2010). Eritrea has not yet played an active role either in stopping or in supporting such activities and its enhanced role would be desirable: it is likely that Chinese partners, that are researching bases in the area, will take advantage of this situation.

The networks in Somalia still rely on direct confrontation tactics, often conducted with ambushes and short-range weapons (over 50% of cases, the last one recorded on August, 15th in the Taleh and Taribunka districts of Mogadishu); less common are attacks carried out with explosives, or which involve hostage-taking or targeted killings. To date, cross-border incursions have been limited to northern Kenya and the very attacks in Kampala might have been the result of local Ugandan structures that adhere – either consciously or unconsciously – to a design that is trans-national in the mind of followers, but that currently does not seem to be supported by adequate funding nor logistical facilities, which should expand the geographical scope of extremism in the Horn. Similar networks in Ethiopia have limited themselves to moderate scale events indeed: they too do not seem to get past the purely local dimension that inspires their actions.

Funding for these groups – as well as for jihadist inspired movements in Somalia – is still largely tied to “prey” and taxation (extortion) of businesses that insist on the territories they control. As a third source of income we can identify the protection of international food aid routes.

In our view, the need for tight territorial control and substantial supine acceptance of people living in the area constitute two weaknesses in the medium term, which can be exploited to reduce the overall size of the threat, provided that the reduction of insecurity is accompanied by a tight commitment to social and economic interventions in a wider sense. Those have proven effective elsewhere in the world – even in those areas that are epicentres of international instability.

The role of the Islamic Courts Union on Somali Politics

The Islamic Courts Union (1) is a union of Sharia Courts which formed out of the Somali chaos of the 1990s to administer justice in the districts in which they were established. In 2000 they formed a union of Islamic Courts to consolidate resources and power, and to take decisions across clan lines. In February 2006, eleven Courts chose to pool their military resources in order to take over Mogadishu, and forming a rival administration both to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and to warlordism.

1991 to 2006

After Siyad Barre’s exile in 1991, Somalia found itself without a political guide. Indeed, Somali government has met in exile for several years. And, with the passing of time, local management has been ruled by ill-famed warlords, who have done as they pleased. It followed many years of tragic chaos in which failed every state organization: Economic structure was completely vanished, due also to a strong famine which hit the country for several times, and basic commodities ran short.
In 2004, the IGAD (a political-commercial organization established by Africa’s Horn countries) nominated a Federal Parliament with a President (Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed – Mr. Yusuf, the most powerful warlord) (2) and a Government (the Transitional Federal Government) of Somalia. Despite the attempt, this weak Institution was never able to rule the country, also because of Mogadishu warlords resistance – members of the government – who benefited by domestic situation to enhance their power.
So, to fill the gap at least in legal system, a form of Islamic Courts, funded through fees paid by litigants, was introduced in civil society. In the course of time courts have begun to offer other services, such as education and health care. To reduce crime, they also acted as local police forces, paid by local businessmen. So, each Court maintained a large militia to act as both police and military force.

As soon as the Courts began to assert themselves as the dispensers of justice, they came into conflict with the secular warlords. So, in reaction to the growing power of ICU, a group of Mogadishu warlords formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). Then, since early days of 2006, in the name of an alleged engagement against al-Qaida, Warlords have begun to kill civilians in Mogadishu, without distinguishing between the crowd of harmless believers and the few really addicted to al-Qaida. Faced to Warlords’ brutality, Somali population took the side with the Islamic Courts.

Southern regions’ residents side with the Courts, Ethiopia opposes them

Thanks to both local population and foreign countries support, ICU was quickly getting control all over the southernmost part of the country (conquering Mogadishu on June, 5th, 2006). The weak TFG – which had made its way back to Somalia but had settled in Baidoa – was not able to manage the situation. So, the Ethiopian army ran to government aid, which had obtained International Community endorsement.

In December 2006 UN Security Council agreed on the Resolution no.1725, opening up the way to an International Regional force which would have “to control and keep security in Baidoa”. As soon as the clash between ICU militia and the TFG troops grew acute, Ethiopian army took action entering Mogadishu after few days of violent shooting.

In January 2007, supported by Somali government, even United States joined indirectly the conflict, at the Ethiopian side. Their engagement in fighting terrorism caused thousands of casualties. Later, African Union sent its troops in Somalia (under the AMISOM flag: African Mission to Somalia) to watch over Mogadishu preventing Islamic Courts militia would come back.
Since Autumn 2007 – as every try attempt at negotiation between FG and opposition has failed – the situation has remained unchanged, and the Somali capital city is a prey of chaos, violence and epidemics. Besides military defeat, ICU is still an existing organization with several bonds inside and outside the country.

Granting to Somali population the stability they needed, ICU obtained people approval. And, taking advantage of the lack of a strong central government, they created a network: local business was restored, and foodstuffs price cut down. Also, after more than 10 years airports were opened again, and a kind of order was established.
Although ICU original mission had been to bring social justice and combat iniquity, after capturing Mogadishu its mission has transformed into imposing Sharia law all over Somalia and changing the constitution. But, among the eleven courts composing the Union, two have reputations as radical. However, Somalia has little history of radical Islam and ICU has not embraced the most extreme forms of Islamic law (3).
ICU Youth Wing, al-Shabaab, is a radical and somewhat independent organization which is integrated quite tightly with ICU armed forces, acting as a sort of “special forces”. Al-Shabaab has caused difficulties for ICU in maintaining a good international image on a number of occasions (4), but ICU formally apologized for each of the incidents, and attempted to make it clear that these actions did not reflect ICU policy.

The Islamic Courts supported the idea of annexing territories controlled by Kenya and Ethiopia, in accordance with the old ideology of “Greater Somalia”. This ideology caused Ethiopia reluctance, and its consequent military engagement at the side of TFG forces.
During the war ICU leaders call for Jihad against Ethiopia, so many international mujahedin volunteers arrived in Somalia. Indeed, a Kenyan Provincial Commissioner revealed the circulation of an intelligence report with the names of up to 4,000 Kenyan Muslim youths who were induced to join ICU ranks by offers of $400.
According to UN and various sources, for many years the Eritrean government has started to arm and finance ICU, and has sheltered Islamic fighters. Many of ICU leaders are believed to have found refuge in Eritrea.
At last, in accordance with UN sources, it seems as ICU drove Warlords out of many towns supported by local population, but also backed by some foreign countries – like Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iran – indeed a support not openly proven and mostly indirect.

In conclusion: a hard solution

It is very hard – although not impossible – to find a solution, which would put an end to Somali case. First, we need to understand Ethiopia role in the whole conflict. As this nation asserted to run to TFG aid, after the Islamic Courts had moved against Somali lawful government.
But, according to what can this Transitional Government be considered as lawful, and legitimated by International Community? As had neither its members ever been elected, but nominated, nor would Somali population vote for them (we do not forget that most of TFG members belonged to warlords’ ranks). Also, since Somali population supports ICU activities, in case of democratic election, majority of people would vote for them. For this reason, peace process must be trusted to the local population, and International Community should involve moderated exponents of ICU in political negotiations. Otherwise no agreement may represent the opinion of all the Somalis.
Indeed, it could be a clever move to let a radical, political-religious movement gravitate towards an institutional circuit. In fact, it would lead to a moderation process, in which the most extremist components would be isolated.

NOTES:
(1) ICU (Arabic: Ittihād al-mahākim al-islāmiyya, Somali: Midowga Maxkamadaha Islaamiga) is also known as the Joint Islamic Courts, Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC) or the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC). Western media often refer to the group as the “Somali Islamists”.
(2) Few days ago, on December, 29th, Somali President, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, announced his resignation, saying he has been unable to bring security to the war-ravaged country.
(3) Some courts do not enforce beyond what the Quran requires, others have beaten people for watching Bollywood films and Western movies or playing “licentious” music. On the other hand, public stoning practice is quite used.
(4) Such as abducting critical journalists, harassing overly-hip youngsters, and most infamously, murdering wounded soldiers in a hospital.

European Parliament and Italy: a contribution to the harsh political situation in Horn of Africa Countries

According to general opinion, there is a great lack of interest about the political situation of the Horn of Africa region and all the problems involved that affect dramatically not only the local population but, indirectly, the whole international community.

The International Institutions, competent with these hard matters, tried to act, but their measures have been hardly enforced and, nowadays, measures that are, in the matter of facts, just declarations of intent, incapable to produce any practical contribution towards the region pacification, are not sufficient any longer.

As already seen in these very days, only those risks affecting the most immediate interests of the International Community, urged European Countries, not directly involved, to take specific actions.

January the 15th, European Parliament approved a resolution (P6_TA-PROV(2009)0026 B6-0033/2009) about the situation in the Horn of Africa; this resolution includes some recommendations about the issues still open, such as:
Regional security;
Alimentary security and development
Human rights, democratization and governance.

REGIONAL SECURITY

About the regional security issue, the above mentioned resolution relates specifically to Algiers Agreements which established a Commission about Eritrean-Ethiopian boundary (EEBC) and placed a UN peacekeeping Mission1 (UNMEE) directly involved in the whole region (mandate ended July 31st 2008, due to Eritrean explicit will to obstacle the mission and Ethiopian refuse to apply the EECB decision over a dispute about Badme region).

About this matter, European Parliament issued a formal request “to Ethiopian Government to formally endorse the EEBC’s demarcation by map coordinates between Eritrea and Ethiopia as final and binding”. Besides, European Parliament “calls on the Eritrean government to agree to a dialogue with Ethiopia, which would address the process of disengagement of troops from the border and physical demarcation in accordance with the EEBC’s decision, as well as the normalisation of relations between the two countries, including reopening the border for trade; calls on the international community and the EU to put pressure on both sides to overcome the current impasse”.

Another qualifying aspect of the aforementioned resolution, is the nomination of a “EU Special Representative/Envoy” to control the region.

Use of “Super Partes” Entities to supervise and guarantee, is the typical way International Institution intervene into disputes over border matters.

About Somalia, European Parliament, “Calls on the Council and Commission to continue their support for institution-building in Somalia, the implementation of the Djibouti peace agreement and the IGAD’s efforts in the peace process; urges the reinforcement of AMISOM and the deployment of the UN stabilisation force in a timely manner as soon as political and security conditions allow”

ALIMENTARY SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

About this particular issue, the European Resolution intends to make Eritrea and Ethiopia responsible for the realization of specific form of cooperation, through the structured interventions of both those International Organizations competent on these matters and the principal Humanitarian Organizations.

More specifically, Ethiopian government is requested to grant Humanitarian Organizations full access to the Ogaden Somali region and to secure the enforcement of those necessary conditions to enable aid to get to the beneficiaries throughout the region.

The Commission is requested to verify that none of its aid programs, including “cash for work” , is realized by means of forced labour.

HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOVERNANCE

Besides, no such measure can be considered separately from a formal acknowledgement and an official commitment, shared by International Community and the involved Countries, to the issue of human rights recognition and those evolutive processes aiming a democratic rule of the countries themselves.

Specifically, the EU Parliament calls on Eritrean government for a formal commitment to acknowledge the whereabouts and the state of health of political prisoners and journalists and, ultimately, to free them. An example: the lasting detention in Eritrea of the Sweden-Eritrean journalist Dawit Isaak, detained since his arrest in September 2001 without any regular process. His immediate release has been requested, in conjunction with a similar request involving every other journalists imprisoned during the same period of the aforementioned episode.

Besides, the Eritrean Government  is called to respect the Human Rights and the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of media and freedom of conscience.

The Somali Transitional Federal Government is requested to explicitly condemn the kidnapping of two Italian catholic nuns, and to adopt every measure in order to speed up their release and prevent further kidnappings.

Djibouti authorities, as well, are called to respect the rights of the opposition parties and to protect the labour rights in accordance with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) core conventions.

Besides the above mentioned recommendations, Ethiopia is asked to “review the press law and party registration law, as well as the composition of the Election Board, so as to ensure that the political rights of opposition parties are guaranteed; urges the Ethiopian authorities to investigate the allegations of harassment and arbitrary arrests affecting the opposition and civil society organisations and to bring those responsible to trial”.

About this last issue, the recommendation contains explicit reference to some specific cases that particularly outraged the International Community; among them the detention of Birtukan Midekssa leader of the opposition party Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) whose immediate and unconditional release is requested, in accordance to the basic democratic principles generally accepted and acknowledged.

Besides the above mentioned EU Parliament Resolution, Italian Chamber of Deputy as well issued a motion (n. 152 25/3/2009) about the political situation of the Countries of the Horn of Africa.

International Criminal Court accuses Sudan President Bashir: a dramatic “Waltz with Bashir”?

by Stefano Cera

In July 2008, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, under UN resolution 1593/2005, accused al-Bashir of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, requesting the issue of an arrest warrant. According to several evidences, Sudanese government have been masterminding attempts to wipe out African ethnic groups Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit.

“Since five years, Sudanese Army and Janjaweed militia, both under Bashir’s control, have attacked and destroyed villages, then persecuted the survivors in the desert. Besides, those who managed to get to the Camps had to endure conditions such as to destroy them.”

According to Ocampo:

“His (Bashir’s) motivations were of political nature; his alibi was the insurrection; his goal the genocide”

The “ powers and the agents” acting under Bashir’s grip, would have killed 35.000 people directly, and between 80.000 and 265.000 indirectly, through their eradication from their villages.

In March the 4th 2009, seven months after ICC challenge – the first ever to involve a still sitting head of state – Chamber One of ICC issues a warrant for the arrest of Bashir on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes but dismissing the accusation of genocide (with a majority of two on three judges).

The debate in the international community

The accusation, triggered a heated debate in the international Community that nourished after the arrest warrant.

According to Antonio Cassese (chairperson of ICID – International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur – in 2005), the initiative of the Court is particularly important as it “keeps public opinion attention on”, but of little practical effect, if not a boomerang, capable to frustrate the work done, considering the actual difficulties to make the warrant effective. For this reason, a subpoena would had been more pragmatic “In this way Sudanese President, in order to explain his reasons, would had been able to attend the Court as a freeman to contest the charges” (La Repubblica, March 25th 2009).

The international Community is facing two different priorities: dispensing justice, making the warrant effective or favouring peace process, by the means of Bashir himself, neglecting his responsibilities in Darfur onslaught.

Those who favour the second priority, fear the consequences of a sentence against Barshir, such as the risk of a sharper “polarization” of the opposite factions. The opposition movements, declared more than once, their unwillingness to dialogue with an internationally wanted person (JEM – Justice and Equalitu Movement – deserted Doha peace process just two month ago). From the opposite front, President Bashir could hamper the slow deployment of peacekeeping mission UNAMID and the action of humanitarian organizations (as already happened with the expulsion of thirteen non governmental organizations), with dramatic consequences over the population. Besides only a sound central government can deploy peace negotiations.

Therefore a wide front (Arab League,African Union, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Conference, Gulf Cooperation Council and, among UN partners, China – main Sudan Commercial partner – and Russia) requested the suspension of the indictment under article 16 of ICC Statute according to which UN Security Council (with the unanimity of its permanent members) has faculty to suspend a prosecutor inquiry or a criminal proceeding for a period – renewable – of 12 months.

Many experts over Sudenese matters favour this solution, such as Alex de Waal who was counselor of African Union during the mediation that brought to Darfour Peace Agreement in May 2006. Alex De Waal urges article 16 application fearing that President Bashir’s National Congress Party, could frustrate Darfur peace process, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by South Sudan in January 2005.

Others, such as Eric Reeves, do not believe a suspension to be effectual: “why should the impunity bring peace to Darfur? The followers of the process of peace ask us to trust a brutal and seditious government, that, in twenty years of power, has never respected any agreement with other parties. They ask us to believe that, from now on, things will be different” (Internazionale., n. 784, february 27th 2009).

Hypotesis of conditional suspension

The International Crisis Group, has emphasized that, according to the situation in Darfur, any suspension should be submitted to strict conditions such as the certainty that any kind of retaliation against diplomatic and civil servants will be avoided. Besides an actual change in government politics is strongly requested through the accomplishment of the following achievements: the institution of a scrupulous internal inquiry apparatus, able to identify the responsibilities in the crimes committed in Darfur, as pointed out by the very same UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon; an actual commitment to peace process, such as allowing opposition movements to attend the negotiations; Bashir’s commitment not to candidate himself at next presidential election (this last issue has been neglected as Bashir officially presented his nomination for next year election).

To achieve these goals, it’s crucial that all the countries and international organizations with stronger relationship with Sudan (China and Russia economically; Egypt, Lybia African Union and Arab League politically) do not back every Khartoum request but use their bounds as a leverage for a real change in the country, pointing out the risks of an international confinement.

The reasons of the arrest warrant supporters

Louise Arbour, former Prosecutor of the international court for ex Jugoslavia, has always declared that enforcing justice doesn’t mean to undermine peace but to foster it. That is the opinion of those who consider the suspension as a risk, adducing the following reasons: first of all it could set a dangerous precedent, able to undermine the credibility of both the Court and the UN; as a matter of fact, declaring Human rights negotiable, would diminish Bashir’s responsibility in persecuting Civilians, persecutions that could even worsen thanks to the impunity. Besides, suspension is feared to nullify Court efforts according to assumption “Justice delayed, justice denied”. In conclusion, arrest warrant could be an effective way to exert pressure for a change even in the same Darfur regime, torn inside by internal disputes. But this is not possible to achieve without a strong and unequivocal support to Court activity from every Nations.

Somalia’s economic structure

Many of Somalia’s productive sectors, already weak before the civil war have been damaged in the course of the country’s ten years of armed conflict and state collapse countries structures that sustained an industrial base and agricultural one have been dismantled and sold for scrap metal. The agricultural production has sharply declined from pre-war level due to deteriorating canal and flood control systems, lack of agricultural inputs and poor security. Livestock sector, historically the most productive part of the Somali economy, has survived reasonably well due in part to its relative autonomy from government services.

It has revealed not essential a guide in order to address all the efforts for an economic local growth especially for the involved country’s area interested also in commercial trade.

Among the different reasons which sheltered indirectly this sector was the destructured commercial trade and an almost complete autonomy form the main economic play role.

An international boundary – the border between Kenya and what once was the Democratic Republic of Somalia – traverses the region of study. While it has never really constrained population movements, the border has been problematic since early in the colonial period and, most dramatically, after Kenya’s independance in 1963. With the collapse of the Somali state in January 1991, the boundaries between the two countries and between different administrative units on the Somalia side became even more ambiguous than before.

Herders and traders still talk about this or that district of Somalia as if they are government units, and surprisingly, some degree of local civil administration exists in the absence of a formal government.

However in 2001 administrative and even international boundaries assume secondary roles to the “real” demarcations enforced by different militia and clan-based factions.

These divisions curtail population movements between different militia controlled areas, generate transit taxes from merchants and others, and in the case of the area’s largest city Kisimayo – cut it off from the rest of the region.

The lower Jubba Region comprises 35,114 square km of remarkably flat land, more than 90 per cent of it classified as rangeland and it encompasses administrative district: Kisimayo area in front of Indian Ocean completely isolated from the internal area west of Badhaade, north east Jamaame area, north Afmadow.

Trade in livestock in this region is permitted mainly for a various reason:

the presence of the Jubba and Tana rivers which make the live stock stationary possible waiting for the trade in the local market of that area.

Garissa District, Kenya in turn, lies adjacent to the Lower Jubba Region and covers 43,931 square km of similar terrain, with the Tana River forming its western border.

The two rivers, thee Jubba and the Tana, flow parallel to each other in a southerly direction and roughly shape the external limits of this region. The distance from east to west between the two waterways is an estimated 360 km.

The addition of a new district, a joint effort of local clan elders and the occupying UN forces at the time, illustrates just how much local politics are alive and well in southern Somalia even in the absence of a state.

Most cultivation in the region is carried out in Jamaame and Kisimayo District on the Somalia side and along the western portion of Garissa District, Kenya.

The large-scale irrigation schemes, managed by government, no longer exist in most of the Jubba Valley. The majority were pillaged shortly after the government’s collapse or, in a few cases, have been taken over by militia heads and their followers.

The environmental characteristics discussed above help to explain the meaning of the livestock sector to the region’s economy.

Indeed prior to the war the region contained approximately 25% of the national cattle herd or an estimated 900,000 animals.

Recent reports and surveys of the area with livestock herders indicate that the livestock herds of southern Somalia have not suffered nearly as much as elsewhere in the country. Old heritage from the past has been important facing with an absence of government “guide”. In a relevant historical time such as this, it avoided to increase rural economy wasting phases and losing “prospective” of economic growth.

The main productive factors, as a basic elements of an archaic tradition, this time play a relevant role as a “constant power-on engine” of a rural economy: this substitute an economy planning impossible in time of war and local clan terrorism where poverty and hungry are constant elements of a “blocked” political “scenario”.

Ethiopia’s attitude towards Somalia and Eritrea

By Paola Trussardi

The Horn of Africa constitutes an exception in the whole continent: with the case of Ethiopia never really colonized and marked by decolonization without being affected by colonialism (1); with wars between states (interstate) and not inside states (intrastates) – how prove both the Eritrean-Ethiopian and the Somali-Ethiopian conflicts; and with the only successful case of secessionism – that of Eritrea.

The origin of “Ethiopian-centrism”

In this area, power has been divided up both ethnical-nationalistic and social-economic grounds: i.e. between nomadic tribes and sedentary people, inhabitants of the plateau and the lowlands, Christian (sometimes also Jewish) and Muslim or animist population, urban elites of the empire and rural immigrants from the outer, Christian Amhara ethnical group and other Christian or non-Christian ethnical groups (as Tigrayan, Gurage and Oromo people).

In the nineteenth century, the Ethiopian empire reached its best period, in term of power and territorial expansion. This empire was marked by the rule of the Christian states from the highlands over the rest of the region: “Ethiopian-centrism” let people from the plateau (Christians, often of the Amhara clan) consider those from lowlands and costs (most of them were Muslims, but also Christians and animists) as people from the outer of the empire. For this reason, the post-colonial wars in the Horn of Africa broke down where the difference between “heart and periphery” was most clear (Stefano Bellucci, Carocci 2006, pp. 85-86).

Since Ethiopia deeply took root in dinasty – the Solomonic one – imperial hierarchy – where the Amharas held the highest stage – and Coptic Church – Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Christian, the Italian colonial policy decided it would be broken down and its empire splitted up, according to a national or ethnical division: all the ethnic groups were officially recognize or better, they were suitable for the fascist politics of undermining stability in the region – the Oromos, for example, were the group which most collaborate with Italy.

Later, in the second half of the seventies, the monarchic-imperial regime, ruled by Haile Selassie (1892 – 1975), collapsed on account of the rising of students demonstration, then controlled by the Ethiopian army. When the Derg – the short name of the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police and Territorial Army, a pro-communist committee of Ethiopian military low ranking officers which ruled the country from 1974 until 1987 – took the power, its leadership changed Ethiopia into a republic and wiped all the imperial-feudal institutions out. The tight control of the military government suppressed every kind of opposition outside and inside the party, and the question of the national identity was tackled by the Derg just as a minor problem – which hid the real problem: the Marxist interpretation of exploitation of men by other men by means of social classes – but, however, the different culture and ethnic groups in the country were officially recognized.  Because of the strong centralization of Ethiopia, an Italian scholar – Giampaolo Calchi Novati (SEI 1994, p. 155) – compared Mengistu Haile Mariam’s politics (2) by the same standard as the nineteenth century empires, but with some arrangements: the class took the place of nation, so as Socialism that of dynasty and Church.

Decolonization and independence

During and after the second world war, the geopolitics of the Horn changed: Ethiopia won again the independence in 1941, Somalia was over Italian mandate from 1950 till 1960, and Eritrea was first federated with Ethiopia (1952), and then annexed to it (1962) – its independence was declared only in 1993.

Actually, conflicts in the Horn of Africa come from cultural and political dispute among economic, social and political realities. And again, every kind of reality in the Horn – state, regional, social and cultural – embodies a social-economic and institutional model which can be explained only through the Ethiopian rule (Stefano Bellucci, Carocci 2006, p. 99). Indeed, besides the Ethiopian struggle between heart and periphery, we know that Pan Somalism clashed with Pan Ethiopianism which, in their turn, included ethnical-nationalist or socialist-revolutionary ideologies; Eritrean nationalist movement was divided in two different trend; and Somali struggle among tribes was only temporary pacified by Siad Barre.

Anyway, the new geopolitical order did not allow to solve some questions, like the double nationalism of Eritrea – divided between the supporters to the federation with Ethiopia and those who refused its supremacy – or Somali irredentism toward Ethiopia – especially, for the return of the Ogaden region.

Eritrean nationalist movements

The singleness of Eritrea is that its nationalism grew against the rule of another African state (Ethiopia) and not to cross European colonial powers – even if conflicts in the Horn have always captured Western power interests. This is, also, the reason why nationalism in that region developed among well-educated middle-class in the post-independence period.

To better understand, we can say that the two trends of the nationalist movement were the symbol of the cultural, ideological and political division: the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF, founded in 1961) defended the interests of Muslim people from the lowlands, while the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF, emerged in 1970 as an intellectual left-wing group that split from the ELF) was controlled by Christian Tigrayan elites from the highlands.

War evolution between Ethiopia and Eritrean nationalists changed in 1989, following the decline of the Soviet Union and diminishing support for Ethiopia, so that rebels moved forward to liberate Eritrean territory – thanks also to US military support. The new government consisting of a coalition of Ethiopian resistance and separatist movements (TPLF – Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front) allied with Eritrean rebels (EPLF), which carried to Eritrea independence (May 1993).

After the quiet period in the 1990s, relationship between Meles Zenawi (Ethiopian leader) and Issaias Aferworki (Eritrean one) got worse, and a new war broke out (1998-2000), officially for a dispute over their borders – the town of Badme (3).

Somali irredentism

At the end of 1960s, armed forces – at that moment, the most well-educated class in the country – took the power in Somalia and, immediately, engaged in a radical change of the society: they tried to turn it from nomadic to sedentary, and from tribal/muslim to socialist.

Since 1969, general Siad Barre had enforced this policy: his first step was the political and social modernization process of the country – i.e. the struggle to tribalism, linked to a cultural and technological development – which, unfortunately, failed because of Siad Barre’s policy of centralization and personality cult. Then, he played the card of Pan Somali nationalism to gain the public agreement he had lost. So, in 1977 Somali army invaded Ogaden to shake Somali Muslim people off the Ethiopian yoke – following the idea of a “Great Somalia”, but also to show how the Somali model of national unity is better than the Ethiopian one – multinational and heir of imperial (Christian Amhara) centralism.

After the Somali defeat in the Ogaden war (1977-1978), Siad Barre went on with the support to the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF – the Ogaden Somali movement in Ethiopia), even if Pan Somalism was progressively turning in ethnicism (1988): Ogaden Somali belonged to the same clan of Siad Barre – the Darod clan.

Not long ago, the Islamic Courts (ICU) has supported the idea of annexing territories controlled by Kenya and Ethiopia, in accordance with the old ideology of “Greater Somalia”. This ideology has caused Ethiopia reluctance, and its consequent military engagement at the side of TFG forces.
During the war ICU leaders has called for Jihad against Ethiopia, so many international mujahedin volunteers arrived in Somalia. And, guided by the same anti-Ethiopian feeling, the Eritrean government has started to arm and finance ICU, and sheltered Islamic fighters. In fact, many of ICU leaders are believed to have found refuge in Eritrea.

Notes

(1) Ethiopia was able to counterbalance the European imperialism, thanks to both United Kingdom’s and France’s will to deal this area as a “buffer zone” among their own empires. Italy could be included in the area because it was not a real European power, so it would not be able to modify the strategic balance settled by London or Paris. Indeed, by virtue of Italian geopolitical weakness, the British Empire – in order to protect its affairs in the Indian Ocean – let the Italian attendance in the Horn of Africa, preferable to French or Germans one.

(2) He was the most prominent officer of the Derg, and the president of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) from 1987 to 1991. Mengistu did not emerge as the leader of the Derg party until 1977. Then, he formally assumed power as head of state, and consolidated his position with the execution of his close associate and potential rival. Under Mengistu, Ethiopia received aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba. In 1987, he dissolved the Derg, and founded a one-party state together with the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WPE).

(3) The town of Badme was ceded by the TPLF to the EPLF in November 1977. After the war (2000), Eritrea and Ethiopia signed the Algiers Agreement which forwarded the border dispute to a boundary commission. In 2002, the commission placed Badme inside Eritrean territory, despite the fact that most of the inhabitants of Badme consider themselves to be Ethiopian citizens.

Somalia: Abdullahi Ahmed Yusuf steps down

By Vincenzo Palmieri

2009 is dawning – on a world taken by the war in Gaza but that also plans to redraw the strategic contours of the war on terror as conducted during latest years – and it is unavoidable that changes in global sceneries reflect on the local level.

First renowned figure to go in Somalia is Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI). He has resigned on December 29th, 2008 and will be replaced by the Speaker of the Parliament, Adan Mohamed Nuur Madobe, until the election of a substitute won’t take place (planned for January, 2009 but still uncertain). In the evolution of Somali politics during last decade, this is an important step toward resolution of the conflict. With the resignation goes a hitherto overwhelming obstacle to national pacification. Still, yet this positive signal is accompanied by uncertainties.

Abdullahi Yusuf has been the pivot of the “Federal Transitional Government” (TFG). Promoted by the IGAD (InterGovernmental Authority on Development) and sponsored by the Ethiopian, the American and various European Governments, it is the fifteenth attempt to find a solution to the Somali crisis, this time through inter-clan accords. Yusuf took part in the TFG project out of personal ambition (his desire was to widen the base of power he enjoyed in Puntland) and Ethiopian interest in securing a close ally and man of order (Army Colonel under Barre) at the top of the Somali institutions.

Yusuf – born in 1934 in Gaalkacyo and belonging to the Majerteen sub-clan, of the Darod clan-family – had been selected from a narrow list. The bonds with Ethiopia were build during the Ogaden war; in 2004 he could present himself also under the double dress of a first-hour opponent of Siyad Barre – at whose fall, Yusuf had emerged as one of Puntland regional leaders – and of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, that had threatened to establish an Islamic emirate in Puntland during the ‘90s.

In 1998 he declared Puntland to be independent and conquered its presidency for a three-years time. New elections approaching in 2001, he waged war against his rival Jama Ali Jama, defeating him. Despite mounting dissatisfaction, Yusuf thus served a second term. In October 2004, after having joined the SRRC (Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council) – headed by Hussein Mohamed Farrah Aidid and connected with Mohamed Dheere also, from his Jowhar stronghold – and few months before a new electoral appointment, Yusuf accepted to race for the Presidency of the all-new Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI). On October 10th, 2004, he won by 189 votes against 79 over his rival, Abdullahi Ahmed Addow: an unexpected election, followed by sour accusations of plots.

Yusuf’s conspicuous personal militia was hence available for the TFG, but never integrated in a national army. A progressive decline has been recorded since, in the number of militiamen, in their discipline and in the quality of their equipments, as evident in the attacks that target Yusuf since September 2006, after the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had taken full control of the capital. Hostility has always accompanied the President, and is deeply rooted in Mogadishu: it is the fruit of distrust toward a merciless warlord – and a “foreign” one too – and is hastened by recurrent plundering waves, carried out by TFG militias against rival (Hawiye) clans, particularly after popular insurrections of April 2007, once the ICU umbrella had been dissolved.

The deep reason for Yusuf’s weakening lies with the erosion of the power distribution system that had brought the Colonel to the apex of the Puntland regional administration and then of the TFG, through rigidly proportional clan schemes. It is not only that the clan does not regiment every aspect of everyday life in the country. Above all, the implementation of such a principle in the TFI – through the “4.5” system – has scientifically frustrated the Hawiye components, whose collaboration is nevertheless essential for the security and the control of the capital.

The political battles won by the President in the last years are a strong evidence of his ability to calculate and build a network of loyalists around him, which has remained unchallenged by his adversaries. This is true both for the internal and the foreign domain. Such resources have not been enough to guarantee him that role of undisputed leader which he craved, while the national picture kept on deteriorating. Only once the external support has been missed, Yusuf’s position became defenceless.

The regional and international support to the TFG project; its failure and the news inside latest political skirmishes

Ethiopian government had approved this formula: it intervened directly in the consultations that brought to the exclusion of Abdullahi Ahmed Addow from the presidency and supported the election and policies of Yusuf. It did so indirectly at first, then directly through military tools (at the end of 2006, after the failure of peace talks in Khartoum between TFG and ICU emissaries).

Despite disagreements inside the Courts offered an opportunity to negotiators, it was preferred to depict Dahir Aweys – who had become the “spiritual guide” and link between different Courts – as a leader of the radical wing. Aweys would have been a reliable interlocutor, while he has been isolated without being offered an alternative. Such an error derived from Aweys’ (who could not sport an immaculate pro-Ethiopia curriculum) reluctance to fight the extremist drift. He did so even when radicals entered Kismayo by conquering it with weapons in September of 2006, while in Merca and Jowhar the Courts had been invited and welcomed by the population.

The dissolution of the Union of Islamic Courts seemed to simplify the problem and fears focused mainly on Yusuf’s state of health (who survived a liver transplant in 1995) rather than on his ability to develop the federal Institutions.

Not only his men have hence assisted helpless to the reduction of their territorial base, to the advantage of radical antagonists generally defined “Islamic.” What frustrated more the external actors involved in the transition process was to see TFG leaders continue in their struggles for internal supremacy. It is possible to simplify this drive as a project – sustained by Yusuf and him close allies such as Mohamed Dheere – to manage the TFIs as an exclusive “interface” organization with the international community, in which political or economic openings to external actors were excluded, even for moderate Hawiye or “Islamic” opposition leaders.

Vivid examples have been the violent quarrels – over oil drilling authorisations – that brought Prime Minister Mohammed Gedi to resign at the end of 2007. He was replaced by Nur Hassan Hussein (“Nur Adde”), solidly sustained by the international community. Constitutional changes were demanded and granted to allow hiss election.

Most recent contrasts with Hussein and the attempt to replace him with Mohamed Mohamud Guled simply slot in – therefore – a well-known political line. Fresh is indeed the increasing irritation with which such skirmishes have been seen by external sponsors, supporting Nur Adde and by now fully disenchanted about the ability of Yusuf to maintain order in Somalia’s most southern regions. This is evident in daily dispatches of violence, refugees’ exodus and the piracy.

The refusal finally opposed by Guled to take part in this busted project – expressed on December 16th – excluded in fact every alternative that did not contemplate Yusuf exiting the political scene.

A failure with shared guilt

Left alone, Yusuf has resigned and entirely taken upon himself the failure of a project that was in fact shared by a number of bordering governments (the Ethiopian and Kenyan ones in primis) and by those in the international community more directly involved in the Horn of Africa (United States, Italy, Great Britain and Sweden). Dozen of local leaders have taken part in it; in fact behind the crash of the Transitional Institutions there is a disastrous approach from many of the stakeholders involved.

There are different reading of the Somali crisis. In primis it is a failure of institutional representation. The clan is an essential factor of the local political life and – although some of the individual references are to the religious or national community and not every dynamic on the territory is always entirely imputable to the tribal component – the equilibrium and the harmony among the different clan-families is essential to national pacification. Effective inclusion in the institutional structures is instead still an open debate today. Regional politicians have not won this primary challenge, notwithstanding local interconnections that should have allowed a better understanding of social dynamics. The crisis refers to the themes of colonial borders, of irredentism and of identity in the whole Horn of Africa. These are these the root causes of animosity between Ethiopia and Eritrea, of the Ogaden problem, of the brittleness of Kenya. Only those who keep in mind these general issues may hope to resolve them, looking therefore at insecurity as an effect rather than a cause.

Great international actors have suffered of the same short-sightedness. Italy has never intended to take sides, but rather to assure the regular carrying out of the general scheme, thus preferring to make the institutional frame advance and the civil society (in Mogadishu, this equals to an offspring of the Islamic opposition) develop. Such choice is formally unquestionable yet in the end it is too abstract a pose to be incisive. British and Swedes have been even more prudent, while the United States – after the disappointments of 1993 – have taken an active role only in 2001. Still, Washington has not spent much time on the institutional architecture, but virtually all the attention went to reports concerning the threats of terrorism. This has lead to debatable and self-defeating attitudes, in particular as far as the categorical exclusion of the moderate components of the Islamic Courts from the process of normalization is concerned. Even Great Britain conformed itself to this vision.

While in Nairobi – during the TFG build-up phase – an unitary, linear and incisive position was maintained, each of these differences has weakened the Transitional Institutions.

The power void in Mogadishu, consequence of international pressures that did not foresee alternative hypotheses

Having established a three thousand-men contingent in Mogadishu, Ethiopia has now started to redeploy its troops toward less visible places – yet equally strategic for border defence. Lacking a substitution (AMISOM troops could soon follow them: their mission has only been prolonged for two months), this implies that Ethiopians military commands accept a power void in the management of security in the Somali capital, crucial for national pacification. Most radical groups will take advantage of it: movements that are anti-Ethiopians, anti-American, anti-western and “Islamic”. News of clashes during early January 2009 confirm this: they took place around Dinsor, in the region of the Galgudud and in that of Balad (Middle Shabelle), between Ethiopian, al-Shabaab and other Islamic groupings.

Somalia is the “archetypal failed state”. The international pressure has forced internal dynamics, above all if it is considered that – following the wave of euphoria for the Djibouti agreement – usually no alternative is foreseen. Kenya, that had always remained neutral among factions (also in consideration of Somali refugees on the national territory, 215.000 according to the most recent figures), has surrendered Yusuf in December 2008, imposing him a personal embargo: he was denied entry in the country and use of his wealth had he not quit the TFG.

The departure of the President may ease inclusion of the Hawiye clan in the Transitional Institutions, according to the criterions established in Djibouti. In fact the signature of that agreement gave momentum to the attempt to fire Nur Adde and – coupled with incumbent elections in Puntland, won by Abdirahman Mohamed “Farole” – explain the coup tried by Yusuf.

Apart from the security risk, the political one is that a quick transfer of power in the hands of the majority clan of the capital seems to happen without a real counterweight to the figures of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Omar Hashi Aden, leader of the moderate wing of the ARS (Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia). In Djibouti, they obtained the right to name hundreds of new members of the Transitional Parliament: 275 out of a total 550. Those lawmakers will elect the new “Government of national unity” (for a two years term), change the Constitution and elect the new President.

It is important not to miss this political opportunity. But it is not clear what decisive approach these leaders can adopt, as far as the tangled knots left behind by Yusuf are concerned: safety in southern regions (particularly in Kismayo, besides Mogadishu, Jowhar and Beletwein); ability to prevent the Shabaabs from attacking Ethiopian and Kenyan objectives, also cross-border (as in the case of the abduction of the two Italian nuns); the attitude they will adopt – after having called for years for a “Islamic Somalia” – once they will eventually get power. This is essential when weighed against an identity model which they have not made explicit yet.

Another issue is the relationship with the intransigent wing of the group, which remained in Eritrea until now, loyal to the principle not to participate to any negotiation until Ethiopian soldiers were on national ground.

Conclusions

How do the Ethiopian, American and European governments intend to act toward them? Their lack of clarity seems linked to the uncertain evolution, but the impression is also that – after the international community has demanded and obtained Yusuf’s resignations and Ethiopian troops withdrawal – Chancelleries are now not caring enough at developments. A proof is given by the insistence with which the United States have tried to get – by the UN – a peacekeeping mission with a blue helmets contingent. This a non practicable solution in this phase as it would only create a new target for the attackers, and not a less tempting one.

The strength of the al-Shabaab in the public opinion resides in a mixture of national and radical elements that shall be well known to those who propose solutions to the Somali crisis; the rehabilitation of prominent characters now detached from the territory risks – instead – to postpone the solution of the problem.

A further weakening element is represented by the loss for the opposition of a connecting cause: now that to the Puntland leader and his militiamen are gone and that foreign Ethiopian troops have followed, what does guarantee that past personal enmities will not pop out again? The election of Sheikh Sharif to the TFI presidency is complicated by the presence of Nur Adde, that belongs to the same clan and does not seem to be prepared to surrender now what he has clutched to just a few weeks ago.

The President will therefore probably be a Majerteen again; the difficulty in finding a substitute and the political skirmishes on which Parliament shall elect him (the old or a new one?) are indicative: Yusuf had been a figure that cannot be easily replaced. especially if the international community does not guarantee necessary funding, providing economic and logistic support to the Somali Institutions.

Somalia: Abdullahi Ahmed Yusuf steps down   by Vincenzo Palmieri
2009 is dawning – on a world taken by the war in Gaza but that also plans to redraw the strategic contours of the war on terror as conducted during latest years – and it is unavoidable that changes in global sceneries reflect on the local level.First renowned figure to go in Somalia is Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI). He has resigned on December 29th, 2008 and will be replaced by the Speaker of the Parliament, Adan Mohamed Nuur Madobe, until the election of a substitute won’t take place (planned for January, 2009 but still uncertain). In the evolution of Somali politics during last decade, this is an important step toward resolution of the conflict. With the resignation goes a hitherto overwhelming obstacle to national pacification. Still, yet this positive signal is accompanied by uncertainties.    Abdullahi Yusuf has been the pivot of the “Federal Transitional Government” (TFG). Promoted by the IGAD (InterGovernmental Authority on Development) and sponsored by the Ethiopian, the American and various European Governments, it is the fifteenth attempt to find a solution to the Somali crisis, this time through inter-clan accords. Yusuf took part in the TFG project out of personal ambition (his desire was to widen the base of power he enjoyed in Puntland) and Ethiopian interest in securing a close ally and man of order (Army Colonel under Barre) at the top of the Somali institutions.   Yusuf – born in 1934 in Gaalkacyo and belonging to the Majerteen sub-clan, of the Darod clan-family – had been selected from a narrow list. The bonds with Ethiopia were build during the Ogaden war; in 2004 he could present himself also under the double dress of a first-hour opponent of Siyad Barre – at whose fall, Yusuf had emerged as one of Puntland regional leaders – and of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, that had threatened to establish an Islamic emirate in Puntland during the ‘90s.   In 1998 he declared Puntland to be independent and conquered its presidency for a three-years time. New elections approaching in 2001, he waged war against his rival Jama Ali Jama, defeating him. Despite mounting dissatisfaction, Yusuf thus served a second term. In October 2004, after having joined the SRRC (Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council) – headed by Hussein Mohamed Farrah Aidid and connected with Mohamed Dheere also, from his Jowhar stronghold – and few months before a new electoral appointment, Yusuf accepted to race for the Presidency of the all-new Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI). On October 10th, 2004, he won by 189 votes against 79 over his rival, Abdullahi Ahmed Addow: an unexpected election, followed by sour accusations of plots.    Yusuf’s conspicuous personal militia was hence available for the TFG, but never integrated in a national army. A progressive decline has been recorded since, in the number of militiamen, in their discipline and in the quality of their equipments, as evident in the attacks that target Yusuf since September 2006, after the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had taken full control of the capital. Hostility has always accompanied the President, and is deeply rooted in Mogadishu: it is the fruit of distrust toward a merciless warlord – and a “foreign” one too – and is hastened by recurrent plundering waves, carried out by TFG militias against rival (Hawiye) clans, particularly after popular insurrections of April 2007, once the ICU umbrella had been dissolved.   The deep reason for Yusuf’s weakening lies with the erosion of the power distribution system that had brought the Colonel to the apex of the Puntland regional administration and then of the TFG, through rigidly proportional clan schemes. It is not only that the clan does not regiment every aspect of everyday life in the country. Above all, the implementation of such a principle in the TFI – through the “4.5” system – has scientifically frustrated the Hawiye components, whose collaboration is nevertheless essential for the security and the control of the capital. The political battles won by the President in the last years are a strong evidence of his ability to calculate and build a network of loyalists around him, which has remained unchallenged by his adversaries. This is true both for the internal and the foreign domain. Such resources have not been enough to guarantee him that role of undisputed leader which he craved, while the national picture kept on deteriorating. Only once the external support has been missed, Yusuf’s position became defenceless.    The regional and international support to the TFG project; its failure and the news inside latest political skirmishes  Ethiopian government had approved this formula: it intervened directly in the consultations that brought to the exclusion of Abdullahi Ahmed Addow from the presidency and supported the election and policies of Yusuf. It did so indirectly at first, then directly through military tools (at the end of 2006, after the failure of peace talks in Khartoum between TFG and ICU emissaries).   Despite disagreements inside the Courts offered an opportunity to negotiators, it was preferred to depict Dahir Aweys – who had become the “spiritual guide” and link between different Courts – as a leader of the radical wing. Aweys would have been a reliable interlocutor, while he has been isolated without being offered an alternative. Such an error derived from Aweys’ (who could not sport an immaculate pro-Ethiopia curriculum) reluctance to fight the extremist drift. He did so even when radicals entered Kismayo by conquering it with weapons in September of 2006, while in Merca and Jowhar the Courts had been invited and welcomed by the population.The dissolution of the Union of Islamic Courts seemed to simplify the problem and fears focused mainly on Yusuf’s state of health (who survived a liver transplant in 1995) rather than on his ability to develop the federal Institutions.    Not only his men have hence assisted helpless to the reduction of their territorial base, to the advantage of radical antagonists generally defined “Islamic.” What frustrated more the external actors involved in the transition process was to see TFG leaders continue in their struggles for internal supremacy. It is possible to simplify this drive as a project – sustained by Yusuf and him close allies such as Mohamed Dheere – to manage the TFIs as an exclusive “interface” organization with the international community, in which political or economic openings to external actors were excluded, even for moderate Hawiye or “Islamic” opposition leaders. Vivid examples have been the violent quarrels – over oil drilling authorisations – that brought Prime Minister Mohammed Gedi to resign at the end of 2007. He was replaced by Nur Hassan Hussein (“Nur Adde”), solidly sustained by the international community. Constitutional changes were demanded and granted to allow hiss election. Most recent contrasts with Hussein and the attempt to replace him with Mohamed Mohamud Guled simply slot in – therefore – a well-known political line. Fresh is indeed the increasing irritation with which such skirmishes have been seen by external sponsors, supporting Nur Adde and by now fully disenchanted about the ability of Yusuf to maintain order in Somalia’s most southern regions. This is evident in daily dispatches of violence, refugees’ exodus and the piracy. The refusal finally opposed by Guled to take part in this busted project – expressed on December 16th – excluded in fact every alternative that did not contemplate Yusuf exiting the political scene.    A failure with shared guilt    Left alone, Yusuf has resigned and entirely taken upon himself the failure of a project that was in fact shared by a number of bordering governments (the Ethiopian and Kenyan ones in primis) and by those in the international community more directly involved in the Horn of Africa (United States, Italy, Great Britain and Sweden). Dozen of local leaders have taken part in it; in fact behind the crash of the Transitional Institutions there is a disastrous approach from many of the stakeholders involved.     There are different reading of the Somali crisis. In primis it is a failure of institutional representation. The clan is an essential factor of the local political life and – although some of the individual references are to the religious or national community and not every dynamic on the territory is always entirely imputable to the tribal component – the equilibrium and the harmony among the different clan-families is essential to national pacification. Effective inclusion in the institutional structures is instead still an open debate today. Regional politicians have not won this primary challenge, notwithstanding local interconnections that should have allowed a better understanding of social dynamics. The crisis refers to the themes of colonial borders, of irredentism and of identity in the whole Horn of Africa. These are these the root causes of animosity between Ethiopia and Eritrea, of the Ogaden problem, of the brittleness of Kenya. Only those who keep in mind these general issues may hope to resolve them, looking therefore at insecurity as an effect rather than a cause.    Great international actors have suffered of the same short-sightedness. Italy has never intended to take sides, but rather to assure the regular carrying out of the general scheme, thus preferring to make the institutional frame advance and the civil society (in Mogadishu, this equals to an offspring of the Islamic opposition) develop. Such choice is formally unquestionable yet in the end it is too abstract a pose to be incisive. British and Swedes have been even more prudent, while the United States – after the disappointments of 1993 – have taken an active role only in 2001. Still, Washington has not spent much time on the institutional architecture, but virtually all the attention went to reports concerning the threats of terrorism. This has lead to debatable and self-defeating attitudes, in particular as far as the categorical exclusion of the moderate components of the Islamic Courts from the process of normalization is concerned. Even Great Britain conformed itself to this vision.   While in Nairobi – during the TFG build-up phase – an unitary, linear and incisive position was maintained, each of these differences has weakened the Transitional Institutions.     The power void in Mogadishu, consequence of international pressures that did not foresee alternative hypotheses  Having established a three thousand-men contingent in Mogadishu, Ethiopia has now started to redeploy its troops toward less visible places – yet equally strategic for border defence. Lacking a substitution (AMISOM troops could soon follow them: their mission has only been prolonged for two months), this implies that Ethiopians military commands accept a power void in the management of security in the Somali capital, crucial for national pacification. Most radical groups will take advantage of it: movements that are anti-Ethiopians, anti-American, anti-western and “Islamic”. News of clashes during early January 2009 confirm this: they took place around Dinsor, in the region of the Galgudud and in that of Balad (Middle Shabelle), between Ethiopian, al-Shabaab and other Islamic groupings.     Somalia is the “archetypal failed state”. The international pressure has forced internal dynamics, above all if it is considered that – following the wave of euphoria for the Djibouti agreement – usually no alternative is foreseen. Kenya, that had always remained neutral among factions (also in consideration of Somali refugees on the national territory, 215.000 according to the most recent figures), has surrendered Yusuf in December 2008, imposing him a personal embargo: he was denied entry in the country and use of his wealth had he not quit the TFG.
The departure of the President may ease inclusion of the Hawiye clan in the Transitional Institutions, according to the criterions established in Djibouti. In fact the signature of that agreement gave momentum to the attempt to fire Nur Adde and – coupled with incumbent elections in Puntland, won by Abdirahman Mohamed “Farole” – explain the coup tried by Yusuf.
Apart from the security risk, the political one is that a quick transfer of power in the hands of the majority clan of the capital seems to happen without a real counterweight to the figures of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Omar Hashi Aden, leader of the moderate wing of the ARS (Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia). In Djibouti, they obtained the right to name hundreds of new members of the Transitional Parliament: 275 out of a total 550. Those lawmakers will elect the new “Government of national unity” (for a two years term), change the Constitution and elect the new President.
It is important not to miss this political opportunity. But it is not clear what decisive approach these leaders can adopt, as far as the tangled knots left behind by Yusuf are concerned: safety in southern regions (particularly in Kismayo, besides Mogadishu, Jowhar and Beletwein); ability to prevent the Shabaabs from attacking Ethiopian and Kenyan objectives, also cross-border (as in the case of the abduction of the two Italian nuns); the attitude they will adopt – after having called for years for a “Islamic Somalia” – once they will eventually get power. This is essential when weighed against an identity model which they have not made explicit yet. Another issue is the relationship with the intransigent wing of the group, which remained in Eritrea until now, loyal to the principle not to participate to any negotiation until Ethiopian soldiers were on national ground.     Conclusions    How do the Ethiopian, American and European governments intend to act toward them? Their lack of clarity seems linked to the uncertain evolution, but the impression is also that – after the international community has demanded and obtained Yusuf’s resignations and Ethiopian troops withdrawal – Chancelleries are now not caring enough at developments. A proof is given by the insistence with which the United States have tried to get – by the UN – a peacekeeping mission with a blue helmets contingent. This a non practicable solution in this phase as it would only create a new target for the attackers, and not a less tempting one.   The strength of the al-Shabaab in the public opinion resides in a mixture of national and radical elements that shall be well known to those who propose solutions to the Somali crisis; the rehabilitation of prominent characters now detached from the territory risks – instead – to postpone the solution of the problem.
A further weakening element is represented by the loss for the opposition of a connecting cause: now that to the Puntland leader and his militiamen are gone and that foreign Ethiopian troops have followed, what does guarantee that past personal enmities will not pop out again? The election of Sheikh Sharif to the TFI presidency is complicated by the presence of Nur Adde, that belongs to the same clan and does not seem to be prepared to surrender now what he has clutched to just a few weeks ago.     The President will therefore probably be a Majerteen again; the difficulty in finding a substitute and the political skirmishes on which Parliament shall elect him (the old or a new one?) are indicative: Yusuf had been a figure that cannot be easily replaced. especially if the international community does not guarantee necessary funding, providing economic and logistic support to the Somali Institutions.

Potential Investment Magnets in Eritrea

By: Dr. Berhane Tewolde, University of Asmara, College of Business and Economics. Department of Economics.

Present Economic Performance.

With GDP and GDP per capita at $1.316 billion and $290 in 2007, the economy of Eritrea depends primarily on agriculture which accounts for about 22% of GDP and 80% of employment. The respective contributions of Services and industry to the economy are 56% and 23% in GDP and 20% combined to employment. Even though the country had an impressive rate of growth of 7% before the border conflict with Ethiopia the real GDP growth rate has remained on the order of 0% to 2% between 1998 and 2007, while there was negative growth of 8.2% in 2000. Presently the government is heavily investing in the agricultural sector and mineral sector. In addition, the strategic location of Eritrea along one of the busiest shipping lines of the world, the Red Sea cost gives it unique advantage in attracting investors. The country has established free processing zone (FPZ) where investors can be shielded from many fiscal impositions in doing business.

According to the investment policy of the country, the Government undertakes only critical investments in strategic sectors of the economy when private investors are unwilling or unable to make needed investments. The policy position of the Government is that creation of production capacities in all contestable markets to be left to the private sector – both domestic and foreign. Under the Eritrean law, private property and investments are protected against nationalization or confiscation. (revised Investment policy, 2007).In the event that there will be compelling public interest that requires expropriation, the law provides for a fair and full compensation.(as articulated in the investment proclamation No 5).

There are investment supporting organizations: The few principal institutions for supporting investment in the country are the Commercial Bank of Eritrea, the Housing and Commercial Bank of Eritrea and the Eritrean Investment and Development Bank. The latter of the three is set up for the objective of promoting and supporting investment initiatives in the country. In order to encourage investors, it charges interest rates that are 2% – 5% lower than the commercial rates. The priority areas that the bank operates are in the sectors of commercial agriculture fisheries, mining and tourism. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), is a regulatory body in charge of commercial and industrial development, plays a vital role in in this area of investment expansion. In addition the Eritrean National Chamber of Commerce (ENCC) plays its role by providing vital information about market and industry conditions and by facilitating linkage between businesses and the regulatory bodies.

There are three main investment opportunities in Eritrea:  fisheries, tourism and mining): let’s see them on by one in the following.

1. Mining Sector: Studies conducted so far show that Eritrea has appreciable mineral resources. Previous studies as well as recent detailed studies and resource evaluation undertaken at Debarwa, Adi Nefas and Embaderho in the central highlands; and Augaro, Bisha and its surroundings in the western lowlands properly justify the aforementioned potential Feasibility study for Presently, mineral exploration companies are actively involved in metallic minerals exploration works and have come up with exiting results in Bisha and its surroundings. (Nevesen baseline data feasibility study, 2006). The exploration for additional resources in the Asmara Mineral belt (Debarwa, Adi Nefas Embaderho) and Gold discovery in Zara were also satisfactory. These exploration works have indicated that Eritrea has substantial Volcanogenic Massive Sulphide (VMS) and shear hosted mineralization. (Global Resources, 2006)

Investment opportunities are enormous: the country is also rich in natural resources including precious minerals and possibly oil and natural gas. The country has gold, silver, copper, zinc and iron in the central highlands forming a belt from north to south. Currently, Nevsun Ltd. of Canada, Sub-Sahara Resources NL/Sunridge of Australia/Canada,Sanu Resources Inc. of Canada, Eritrean Minerals Corporation of Eritrea/Canada and Dragon Mining Plc/Sub-Sahara of Australia along with other small companies hold exploration projects in different parts of Eritrea. All these companies have achieved remarkable success in their respective project areas.  Although the sector  is with bright future, there are certain problems impeding investment from taking place.This include: Weak institutional capacity, Budget problems/shortages, Traditional artesian mining still in practice. So much so up until now there are certain major activities going on in the country. This major projects include: The Bisha Gold-Silver-Zinc project, The Asmara Project (Gold, copper and zinc).

2. Tourism sector:  The second potential investment sector is  tourism: Tourism sector in the country started out in 1991 after the liberation of the country from Ethiopia. After independence tourists that came in significant numbers were Eritrean citizens that live abroad. (Tesfaledet.M, 2006) Every year people come from various corners of the world to meet their families and their country. But the tourism potential of the country is not limited to citizens living abroad only. Since the country has many places of rich old and recent historical events, great beaches along the coast and impressive landscape the prospect for foreigners-oriented tourism investment is also great.  Investment Opportunities are enormous: For example, with more than 1000 kms of Red Sea coastline and 305 mostly virgin island, tourism is expected to become an important pillar of Eritrea’s economy in the coming years. The Ministry of Tourism has set up attractive investment incentive including 100% investor ownership. The country has rich architecture which reflects history of Turkish, Italian and Egyptian settlers. It has also multiple landscapes and different climates and crime rate is minimal. Right now the Red sea is the priority area for developing the sector of tourism. (MOT,2007).

Investment Promotion Actions Undertaken so far include: International standard hotels built mainly in the capital Asmara and the International Airport and the port city of Massawa as well as asmara based Intercontinental Hotel, Savannah Hotel, Top Five Hotel etc.The 500km long highway constructed along the coast from Massawa to Assab crossing area of rich biodiversity and coastal marvels.  Approximately 80 km road built along the eastern escarpment from Asmara to Massawa passing through dense semi-tropical forests and amazing landscape. The Eritrean Railway rehabilitated connecting the port city of Massawa to the capital Asmara. However fast development efforts are impeded by: Weak institutional and financial capacity, as well as war with Ethiopia which damaged the perceived attractiveness of the country. (Eritrea horizon, MOT, 2007).

3. Fisheries:  The Red Sea is a rich and diverse ecosystem. More than 1100 species of fish have been recorded in the Red Sea, and around 10% of these are found nowhere else. Eritrea has more than 1000 km of coastline along the Red Sea with territorial waters of 12 nautical miles, and more than 300 small and medium sized islands. The shallow shelf of the sea is very suitable for various sea plants and animals. There is untapped potential in this sector with sustainable stock of 40,000 – 85,000 tons/year. In contrast the present level of fish exploitation is very low amounting to only 9,000 tons/year. There is landing, refrigeration, and processing infrastructure facilities exist in Massawa and Assab, the two principal Eritrean ports. Smaller facilities also exist in Gelallo, Tio and Eddi. Small harbours exist in the island of Dahlak, Wekiro and Barasole. (Ministry of Fisheries, 2007)

The potential Investment Opportunities in this sector are numerous: The Eritrean Red Sea has shallow waters which is very suitable for biodiversity. There are more than 1,100 species of fish in the red sea, some of which are highly demanded fish in the international market including shrimp and lobsters. As part of the overriding goal of ensuring national food security in the country the government encourages investors to participate in the country’s fishing industry. The government has also established the National Fishing Corporation in order to lead and supplement the efforts being done in the sector. The ministry of Fisheries has revised its policies and procedures in order to make them attractive to foreign investors and make the country’s fishing industry competitive. So far to attract investors the actions taken include: The establishment Eritrean Fish Corporation, Proclamation enacted on fishing related operations, Various docks with fishing facilities built along the coast, Training given to artisan fishers, Low interest loans extended to traditional fishermen, Grounds for shrimps reproducing and raising shrimps established. However, the above actions has its own problems like: Very low ice production, very old artesian fishing boats, Lack of marketing institutions an facilities, Small and undeveloped domestic market

Conclusion : Investment opportunities in the country are is high. the Red Sea coast is rich in fish and the sea attracts various fishing vessels from around the world in search of quality fish. The country’s rich historical and natural endowment are some of the main attraction factors for investors in the tourism sector. The government’s investment policy has made it possible for investment policy to be investor attraction. All in all it can be concluded that the country is one of Africa’s most suitable area’s for foreign as well as domestic investors.

Reference:

- Eritrea Horizon, the tourism Industry, the Official magazine of Ministry of Tourism, 2007

- Revised Investment Policy of Eritrea, May 2007

- Ministry of Trade and Industry, Annual Report 2007

- Chamber of Commerce, Annual Businesses’ report, 2007

- Macro Policy of the State of Eritrea, 1994

- Poverty Reduction strategy paper, 2002

- Five years  strategic plan, Ministry of Agriculture, 2008

-Tourism Related information, since 1998. Ministry of Tourism, Asmara, 2008

- Ministry of Fisheries, An Overview of the Eritrean Fisheries sector, May 2007.

-Tesfaledet M. Tourism and its economic impacts in Eritrea.  2007.

- Global Resources, baseline data study Nivesen mining corporation, 2006).

Potential Investment  Magnets in EritreaBy: Dr. Berhane Tewolde, University of Asmara, College of Business and Economics. Department of Economics.
Present Economic Performance.
With GDP and GDP per capita at $1.316 billion and $290 in 2007, the economy of Eritrea depends primarily on agriculture which accounts for about 22% of GDP and 80% of employment. The respective contributions of Services and industry to the economy are 56% and 23% in GDP and 20% combined to employment. Even though the country had an impressive rate of growth of 7% before the border conflict with Ethiopia the real GDP growth rate has remained on the order of 0% to 2% between 1998 and 2007, while there was negative growth of 8.2% in 2000. Presently the government is heavily investing in the agricultural sector and mineral sector. In addition, the strategic location of Eritrea along one of the busiest shipping lines of the world, the Red Sea cost gives it unique advantage in attracting investors. The country has established free processing zone (FPZ) where investors can be shielded from many fiscal impositions in doing business.
According to the investment policy of the country, the Government undertakes only critical investments in strategic sectors of the economy when private investors are unwilling or unable to make needed investments. The policy position of the Government is that creation of production capacities in all contestable markets to be left to the private sector – both domestic and foreign. Under the Eritrean law, private property and investments are protected against nationalization or confiscation. (revised Investment policy, 2007).In the event that there will be compelling public interest that requires expropriation, the law provides for a fair and full compensation.(as articulated in the investment proclamation No 5).
There are investment supporting organizations: The few principal institutions for supporting investment in the country are the Commercial Bank of Eritrea, the Housing and Commercial Bank of Eritrea and the Eritrean Investment and Development Bank. The latter of the three is set up for the objective of promoting and supporting investment initiatives in the country. In order to encourage investors, it charges interest rates that are 2% – 5% lower than the commercial rates. The priority areas that the bank operates are in the sectors of commercial agriculture fisheries, mining and tourism. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), is a regulatory body in charge of commercial and industrial development, plays a vital role in in this area of investment expansion. In addition the Eritrean National Chamber of Commerce (ENCC) plays its role by providing vital information about market and industry conditions and by facilitating linkage between businesses and the regulatory bodies.
There are three main investment opportunities in Eritrea:  fisheries, tourism and mining): let’s see them on by one in the following.
1. Mining Sector: Studies conducted so far show that Eritrea has appreciable mineral resources. Previous studies as well as recent detailed studies and resource evaluation undertaken at Debarwa, Adi Nefas and Embaderho in the central highlands; and Augaro, Bisha and its surroundings in the western lowlands properly justify the aforementioned potential Feasibility study for Presently, mineral exploration companies are actively involved in metallic minerals exploration works and have come up with exiting results in Bisha and its surroundings. (Nevesen baseline data feasibility study, 2006). The exploration for additional resources in the Asmara Mineral belt (Debarwa, Adi Nefas Embaderho) and Gold discovery in Zara were also satisfactory. These exploration works have indicated that Eritrea has substantial Volcanogenic Massive Sulphide (VMS) and shear hosted mineralization. (Global Resources, 2006)
Investment opportunities are enormous: the country is also rich in natural resources including precious minerals and possibly oil and natural gas. The country has gold, silver, copper, zinc and iron in the central highlands forming a belt from north to south. Currently, Nevsun Ltd. of Canada, Sub-Sahara Resources NL/Sunridge of Australia/Canada,Sanu Resources Inc. of Canada, Eritrean Minerals Corporation of Eritrea/Canada and Dragon Mining Plc/Sub-Sahara of Australia along with other small companies hold exploration projects in different parts of Eritrea. All these companies have achieved remarkable success in their respective project areas.  Although the sector  is with bright future, there are certain problems impeding investment from taking place.This include: Weak institutional capacity, Budget problems/shortages, Traditional artesian mining still in practice. So much so up until now there are certain major activities going on in the country. This major projects include: The Bisha Gold-Silver-Zinc project, The Asmara Project (Gold, copper and zinc).
2. Tourism sector:  The second potential investment sector is  tourism: Tourism sector in the country started out in 1991 after the liberation of the country from Ethiopia. After independence tourists that came in significant numbers were Eritrean citizens that live abroad. (Tesfaledet.M, 2006) Every year people come from various corners of the world to meet their families and their country. But the tourism potential of the country is not limited to citizens living abroad only. Since the country has many places of rich old and recent historical events, great beaches along the coast and impressive landscape the prospect for foreigners-oriented tourism investment is also great.  Investment Opportunities are enormous: For example, with more than 1000 kms of Red Sea coastline and 305 mostly virgin island, tourism is expected to become an important pillar of Eritrea’s economy in the coming years. The Ministry of Tourism has set up attractive investment incentive including 100% investor ownership. The country has rich architecture which reflects history of Turkish, Italian and Egyptian settlers. It has also multiple landscapes and different climates and crime rate is minimal. Right now the Red sea is the priority area for developing the sector of tourism. (MOT,2007).
Investment Promotion Actions Undertaken so far include: International standard hotels built mainly in the capital Asmara and the International Airport and the port city of Massawa as well as asmara based Intercontinental Hotel, Savannah Hotel, Top Five Hotel etc.The 500km long highway constructed along the coast from Massawa to Assab crossing area of rich biodiversity and coastal marvels.  Approximately 80 km road built along the eastern escarpment from Asmara to Massawa passing through dense semi-tropical forests and amazing landscape. The Eritrean Railway rehabilitated connecting the port city of Massawa to the capital Asmara. However fast development efforts are impeded by: Weak institutional and financial capacity, as well as war with Ethiopia which damaged the perceived attractiveness of the country. (Eritrea horizon, MOT, 2007).
3. Fisheries:  The Red Sea is a rich and diverse ecosystem. More than 1100 species of fish have been recorded in the Red Sea, and around 10% of these are found nowhere else. Eritrea has more than 1000 km of coastline along the Red Sea with territorial waters of 12 nautical miles, and more than 300 small and medium sized islands. The shallow shelf of the sea is very suitable for various sea plants and animals. There is untapped potential in this sector with sustainable stock of 40,000 – 85,000 tons/year. In contrast the present level of fish exploitation is very low amounting to only 9,000 tons/year. There is landing, refrigeration, and processing infrastructure facilities exist in Massawa and Assab, the two principal Eritrean ports. Smaller facilities also exist in Gelallo, Tio and Eddi. Small harbours exist in the island of Dahlak, Wekiro and Barasole. (Ministry of Fisheries, 2007)
The potential Investment Opportunities in this sector are numerous: The Eritrean Red Sea has shallow waters which is very suitable for biodiversity. There are more than 1,100 species of fish in the red sea, some of which are highly demanded fish in the international market including shrimp and lobsters. As part of the overriding goal of ensuring national food security in the country the government encourages investors to participate in the country’s fishing industry. The government has also established the National Fishing Corporation in order to lead and supplement the efforts being done in the sector. The ministry of Fisheries has revised its policies and procedures in order to make them attractive to foreign investors and make the country’s fishing industry competitive. So far to attract investors the actions taken include: The establishment Eritrean Fish Corporation, Proclamation enacted on fishing related operations, Various docks with fishing facilities built along the coast, Training given to artisan fishers, Low interest loans extended to traditional fishermen, Grounds for shrimps reproducing and raising shrimps established. However, the above actions has its own problems like: Very low ice production, very old artesian fishing boats, Lack of marketing institutions an facilities, Small and undeveloped domestic market
Conclusion : Investment opportunities in the country are is high. the Red Sea coast is rich in fish and the sea attracts various fishing vessels from around the world in search of quality fish. The country’s rich historical and natural endowment are some of the main attraction factors for investors in the tourism sector. The government’s investment policy has made it possible for investment policy to be investor attraction. All in all it can be concluded that the country is one of Africa’s most suitable area’s for foreign as well as domestic investors.
Reference:
- Eritrea Horizon, the tourism Industry, the Official magazine of Ministry of Tourism, 2007- Revised Investment Policy of Eritrea, May 2007- Ministry of Trade and Industry, Annual Report 2007- Chamber of Commerce, Annual Businesses’ report, 2007- Macro Policy of the State of Eritrea, 1994- Poverty Reduction strategy paper, 2002- Five years  strategic plan, Ministry of Agriculture, 2008-Tourism Related information, since 1998. Ministry of Tourism, Asmara, 2008- Ministry of Fisheries, An Overview of the Eritrean Fisheries sector, May 2007. -Tesfaledet M. Tourism and its economic impacts in Eritrea.  2007. - Global Resources, baseline data study Nivesen mining corporation, 2006).